American University International Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 4

Article 3

2011

The Argument Against International Abduction of
Criminal Defendants: Amicus Curiae Brief Filed by
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in
United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain
Ruth Wedgwood

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Wedgwood, Ruth. "The Argument Against International Abduction of Criminal Defendants: Amicus Curiae Brief Filed by the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights in United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain." American University International Law Review 6, no. 4
(1991): 537-569.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

THE ARGUMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
ABDUCTION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
AMIcus CURIAE BRIEF FILED By THE LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN UNITED STATES V. HUMBERTO ALVAREZMACHAIN

Ruth Wedgwood*
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
All citizens of national states, including American, Mexican, and
Kuwaiti alike, share a common interest in the fundamental human liberty to be free from abduction, disappearance and arbitrary arrest. Using illegal force and violence to remove any person from his homeland
erodes the standards of international law on which all citizens of free
states have relied. Humberto Alvarez-Machain is wanted in the United
States for extremely serious crimes committed in Mexico in the course
of a narcotics racketeering enterprise. But it is the glory of the United
States and its system of justice that we proceed by principle rather
than expedience. The short-run temptation to obtain and punish a particular defendant should not be allowed to endanger the liberty of all.
1.

THE KIDNAPPING AND ABDUCTION OF HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-

MACHAIN BY PERSONS ACTING AT THE REQUEST OF UNITED STATES
AGENTS VIOLATED THE

1980

TREATY OF EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, AND DEPRIVED THE TRIAL COURT OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT.

Extradition treaties serve the several purposes of promoting the enforcement of criminal law, protecting the sovereignty of each signatory
nation over its own territory, and providing safeguards for the civil liberties of citizens and other individuals in inter-state surrenders. The
United States-Mexico extradition treaty contains provisions guarding
against double jeopardy, violations of statutes of limitations, and extradition for political offenses. The treaty preserves to both nations the
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Board of Directors, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. This article reproduces the arguments from the brief filed by
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in United States v. Humberto AlvarezMachain, No. 90-50459 (9th Cir. 1990), with minor alterations to conform to law journal style.
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right to decline extradition of their own national citizens. The treaty
provides for each nation's scrutiny of the evidence supporting an extradition request, before extradition is granted. In both countries, this includes scrutiny by a reviewing judge. The treaty also allows each nation to terminate its participation in the treaty guarantees upon six
months notice. It would make a mockery of these protections to suppose that nonetheless, without observing the treaty safeguards, the
treaty permits either nation to kidnap citizens within the territory of
the other and continue their detention once "safely" over the border.
The forcible abduction of Alvarez-Machain from his workplace in
Mexico and his continued detention for trial violate the 1980 United
States-Mexico treaty.'
The plain language and structure of the United States-Mexico
treaty, its history, the public record assertions of prior Secretaries of
State, and the authoritative Harvard Research in International Law
support this view. The United States Attorney is simply mistaken in his
assertion that this view of extradition treaties lacks authority. The plain
language of the 1980 extradition treaty recognizes and protects the territorial sovereignty of the treaty parties. The careful procedures and
standards of the treaty make sense only in light of this bar against
transborder abductions. The Harvard Research in International Law,
and the assertions of former Secretaries of State, concur that extradition treaties preclude extra-treaty abductions. That a treaty may limit
the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States and its courts is established by the cases of United States v. Rauscher,2 Ford v. United
States,' and Cook v. United States." The Harvard Research in International Law, and the assertions of former Secretaries of State also suggest that governmental abductions violating extradition treaties preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the United States
government as treaty signatory.
Ker v. lllinois5 is entirely distinct from this case. There are two crucial differences. In Ker, the extradition treaty between the United
States and Peru was not in effect because of the occupation of Peru by
Chilean troops. And in Ker, the government of Peru as treaty party did
1. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and United Mexican
States (signed May 4, 1978; entered into force Jan. 25, 1980), 31 U.S.T. 5059,
T.I.A.S. No. 9656, registered by the United States in the United Nations Treaty Series
as U.N.T.S. 19462 on Dec. 9, 1980, pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
2. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
3. 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
4. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
5. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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not raise any protest or objection to the detention and trial of the defendant, neither claiming that its right nor the derivative entitlement of
the defendant was violated. These reasons wholly distinguish Ker from
the present case. In addition, as the District Court noted, in Ker no
official of the United States government, as treaty party, procured, induced, or otherwise authorized the extra-treaty abduction of the defendant on foreign soil. And in Ker, the defendant was a United States
citizen, not a national of Peru, and thus Peru retained no general right
under the treaty to refuse his surrender for trial in the United States.
The limited reach of the Ker decision has been noted for almost forty
years.
This case is also entirely distinct from the sui generis trial of General
Manuel Noriega, and from the problem of inter-state surrenders in the
United States. In the case of General Noriega, the government of Panama has interposed no objection to the arrest and trial of General
Noriega, and the captures occurred in .a military action directly ordered by the President of the United States. So, too, issues concerning
domestic surrenders of defendants within the United States are distinct
from international extradition. More stringent protections have been included in international extradition treaties, such as tests for the adequacy of evidence, statutes of limitations, double jeopardy, political offenses, and discretionary surrender of citizens, precisely because
systems of justice may vary widely between treaty signatories. Hence,
this case need not affect any of the rules concerning domestic surrenders and recovery of bail fugitives within the United States, including
Frisbie v. Collins' and Gerstein v. Pugh, for defendants in all states of
the Union enjoy the safety of the basic guarantees of the United States
Constitution.
Circumstances where a foreign nation has agreed to waive its treaty
rights or has agreed to other means of surrender such as deportation,
are distinct from this case. Here Mexico, acting on behalf of its own
national citizen, has protested the unilateral violation of the treaty by
United States agents and persons acting at their behest. To detain the
defendant for trial following his illegal arrest and abduction from Mexican territory at the request of federal agents places Article III courts
in the undesirable position of prolonging a detention that violates international law. This is not required by any conception of separation of
powers. The issue of a court's own jurisdiction over the person of a
6.
7.

342 U.S. 519 (1952).
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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defendant lies at the heart of the judiciary's special province to say
what the law is.
2.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ALSO FORBIDS THE ABDUCTION

OF A FOREIGN CITIZEN ON THE SOIL OF A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN, AND
REQUIRES THAT AN ABDUCTED CITIZEN BE RESTORED TO HIS
HOMELAND.

Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 8 forbids the
arbitrary arrest of any individual. An arrest without authority and jurisdiction is by its nature arbitrary. The United States approved the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights at its adoption in 1948 by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration is now taken to be a restatement of customary international law.
This guarantee of customary international law, which binds all nations,
is fundamental to human dignity. Latin American countries, including
Mexico, have suffered serious human rights abuses through the practice
of illegal abductions and kidnappings by private factions, and by their
own domestic police and military agencies. For the United States to
indulge in the practice of illegal abduction on another country's soil
will tarnish our example as a country dedicated to the rule of law.
It has been fundamental to American jurisprudence since Chief Justice John Marshall decided Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy9 that
federal law will be interpreted to uphold customary international law
where federal law possibly admits of the interpretation. So, too, in The
Paquete Habana1 ° the Supreme Court concluded that customary international law should be deemed part of United States law, unless modified by a controlling act of one of the political branches. For two separate and independent reasons, there was no controlling act of the
political branches in the abduction of Alvarez-Machain and hence customary international law was not displaced. First, the abduction was
not approved by the President. The abduction was known only to officials of the Drug Enforcement Administration and some unknown aide
in the office of the Attorney General. The United States Attorney does
not purport to suggest that the President of the United States was ever
consulted in the decision to abduct Alvarez-Machain, or that he issued
any policy directive for the violation of Mexico's sovereignty by the
8. G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3(1) U.N. GAOR Resolutions 71, U.N. Doc. A/810,
(1948).
9. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
10. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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abduction of nationals from her territory. 1 Second, it has been traditional in our constitutional jurisprudence that only the legislature can
seek to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Hence, though an
Executive order might determine whether fishing boats on the high seas
should be forfeit as prize vessels under the law of war, no one has ever
supposed that a Presidential order could modify the jurisdiction of Article III courts or require Article III courts to assume jurisdiction of a
cause in violation of international law. Though Judge Rafeedie did not
have occasion to reach this ground, the District Court was entitled to
decline personal jurisdiction over Humberto Alvarez-Machain on the
ground of customary international law.
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican physician, is charged with
terrible crimes against an American law enforcement agent stationed in
Mexico. Alvarez-Machain's charges involve kidnapping, torture and
murder. In arguing for the rule of law, no one can minimize the seriousness of the offenses involved here. The issue only is whether, in the
face of a treaty guarantee and the rules of customary international law,
a government can indulge in one of the very techniques charged against
the defendant-that of extra-legal kidnapping.
ARGUMENT
1.

THE KIDNAPPING AND ABDUCTION OF HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-

MACHAIN BY PERSONS ACTING AT THE REQUEST OF UNITED STATES
AGENTS VIOLATED THE

1980

TREATY OF EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE

UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, AND DEPRIVED THE TRIAL COURT OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT.

A.

The extradition treaty of 1980 prohibits transborderabductions.

The United States Attorney contends that the 1980 extradition
treaty between the United States and Mexico leaves each country free
to abduct citizens from the territory of the other-that such an abduction is not a violation of the extradition treaty regime and treaty under11. At a speech in Los Angeles on April 23, 1990, President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari called for greater respect for international law and an end to "unilateral actions outside the law and infringing the rights of other nations." President Bush. at a
news conference on May 3, 1990, said "yes, there were some misunderstandings here

and I've told our key people to eliminate the misunderstanding. We don't need misunderstanding with Mexico ....

" Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by Government Order A Fol-

low-Up, 84 Ar. J. IN''L L. 712, 715 n.10 (1990).
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takings.' 2 The District Judge properly dismissed this contention as "absurd." 13 The construction sought by the United States Attorney would
allow Mexico to kidnap an American citizen from New York City for
trial on a political offense, without any violation of the extradition
treaty. By the United States Attorney's view, a Mexican police agent
could spirit an American from Los Angeles to Guadalajara for a

charge on which there is no evidence, without any violation of the extradition treaty. This mole's eye view would make a nullity of the
treaty promises, and is blind to the careful procedures that protect
Americans as much as Mexican citizens from unreviewed deliveries
across the border. The United States Attorney's view is contradicted by

the logic and history of the treaty, including the assertions of past Secretaries of State, by prior case law, and by the Harvard Research in
International Law.
The present extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico was signed in Mexico City on May 4, 1978.14 Ratification was advised by the United States Senate on November 30, 1979. Ratifications
were exchanged at Washington, D.C. on January 25, 1980, and on that
date, the treaty entered into force. On February 6, 1980, the President
of the United States issued the following proclamation:
Now, THEREFORE, I, Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of
America, proclaim and make public the Treaty, to the end that it be observed
and fulfilled with good faith on and after January 25, 1980, by the United States
of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other
persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof. 15

The treaty with Mexico has remained in force since that date."0 No
President has suggested that the treaty is in any measure suspended,
terminated, or repudiated. The treaty undertakings by the United

States are promises 'willingly assumed. At any time since 1980, the
12. The issue is styled this way by the United States Attorney in the hope that
American courts will disclaim any responsibility for the observance of the civil liberties
protections of foreign law and customary international law. Even if this were an appropriate conclusion, the United States Attorney is forced to recognize that extradition
treaties have traditionally been enforced by the United States courts in criminal proceedings affecting foreign individuals.
13. United States v. Caro-Quintero, et aL, 745 F. Supp. 599, 610 (C.D. Cal. 1990)
(Rafeedie, J.). Though captioned by the name of the lead defendant in the pending
indictment, this opinion deals solely with defendant Humberto Alvarez-Machain.
14. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and United Mexican
States, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, registered by the United States in the
United Nations Treaty Series as U.N.T.S. 19462 on Dec. 9, 1980, pursuant to Article
102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
15. Id.
16. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 160 (1990).
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United States could have chosen to exercise its right under Article
23(4) of the treaty, which allows either party to "terminate this Treaty

by giving notice to the other Party." Termination would have taken
effect six months later. Instead, the United States has remained as

Contracting Party to the treaty.
Extradition treaties serve the several purposes of promoting the enforcement of criminal law, protecting the sovereignty of each signatory

nation over its own territory, and providing safeguards for the civil liberties of citizens and other individuals in inter-state surrenders. In the
last two centuries, extradition has been an obligation that, in the American view, exists solely by virtue of treaty. The United States has stren-

uously defended the position that only where a treaty undertaking has
been made, need a nation surrender a fugitive accused of even heinous
crime. The United States has consistently asserted in international affairs that absent a treaty, there is no obligation by any unwritten law
of nations to return an offender to a foreign state.17 The history of

America explains this axiom: many of our ancestors were in flight from
foreign oppression, and any general obligation to return persons ac-

cused of crime would have endangered emigrants from tyrannical
lands."8 To protect our own national citizens, yet provide cooperation in
enforcing criminal law, the United States has negotiated treaty undertakings for the return of fugitive criminals with countries whose system
17.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED
ch. 7, subch. B, Extradition,Introductory Note, at 557 (1987) ("it is accepted
that states are not required to extradite except as obligated to do so by treaty"); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 941, at 597-98 (Philadelphia 1872) ("it has been maintained by high authority,
both in Europe and the United States, that the duty of one sovereign to surrender to
another fugitives from justice has no basis in international law, and only exists when
created by treaty between the two sovereigns concerned. . . . This view['s] . . . chief
support has been found in the United States."); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (Philadelphia 1836) ("No sovereign state is bound, unless by
special compact, to deliver up persons, whether its own subjects or foreigners, charged
with or convicted of crimes committed in another country, upon the demand of a foreign state or its officers of justice."). See also LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES
333 (1961, reissued 1986) (British Government also "has, at any rate for a very long
time, maintained that the surrender of an alleged criminal or an escaped convict cannot, as a matter of international law, be claimed in the absence of a treaty creating an
obligation to do so.").
18. See FRANCIS WHARTON, supra note 17, at 598 ("Cherishing as we have always
done the right of free asylum for political and religious refugees, both as one of the
happiest agents of our own colonization and as one of the proudest prerogatives of our
institutions, it was natural that our statesmen and jurists should at an early period have
declared that there was no duty either moral or juridical which made it incumbent on
our government, unless under the sanction of a prior treaty, to surrender to foreign
sovereigns fugitives who, even when under criminal prosecution, find refuge on our
shores.").
STATES,
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of criminal justice meets our basic standards of fairness. Extradition
treaties with Mexico have been in force since the middle nineteenth
century, 19 long before the multilateral treaties of this century, such as
the United Nations Charter or Charter of the Organization of American States.
The present extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico contains numerous safeguards, designed to protect citizens of both
countries. There would be no point to any of these protections if a foreign government could evade them by sending armed men to abduct
suspects. Under the Mexico-United States treaty, an extradition request can be made only for a crime punishable by a year or more in
prison and is limited to federal crimes and a specified schedule of state
crimes. See Article 2. Adequate evidence must be submitted by the
requesting state to support the extradition request: extradition shall be
granted "only if the evidence be found sufficient, according to the laws
of the requested Party, either to justify the committal for trial of the
person sought if the offense of which he has been accused had been
committed in that place or to prove that he is the person convicted by
the courts of the requesting Party." See Article 3. The treaty prohibits
extradition when the offense "is political or of a political character."
See Article 5(1). The treaty prohibits any violation of double jeopardy
rules, forbidding extradition where a person has already been prosecuted for the offense. See Article 6. Each state party can refuse extradition where the death penalty could be imposed on the defendant in
the requesting country and the laws of the requested country would not
provide for such punishment. See Article 8. The treaty provides that
any request for extradition shall be processed "in accordance with the
legislation" of the requested treaty party, see Article 13, and in Mexi19. The earlier United States-Mexico extradition treaties are the 1862 treaty, the
1899 treaty, and the Supplementary Conventions of 1903, 1926, and 1941. See Treaty
Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the Extradition of Criminals (entered into force May 20, 1862; terminated January 24, 1899), 12
Stat. 1199, T.S. No. 209; Treaty of Extradition, United States of America-United
States of Mexico (entered into force April 22, 1899; terminated Jan. 25, 1980), 31
Stat. 1818, T.S. No. 242; Supplementary Convention (entered into force April 13,
1903), T.S. No. 421 (adding bribery to list of extraditable offenses); Supplementary
Convention (entered into force July 11, 1926), 44 Stat. 2409, T.S. No. 741 (adding
narcotics offenses, hazardous substances, and smuggling); Supplementary Extradition
Convention Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States
(entered into force April 14, 1941), 55 Stat. 1133, T.S. No. 967 (extending extradition
to accessories) (supplementary conventions terminated Jan. 25, 1980). The early history of negotiations between the United States and Mexico is discussed in JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 95-97
(1891).
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can law, this requires a hearing for the defendant before a Mexican
federal judge before extradition can proceed. 20
The treaty makes provision for so-called "provisional arrests" by the
requested government, to hold a fugitive until the supporting evidence
can be delivered. See Article 11. The treaty provides that either country may decline to extradite its own citizens, and instead may submit
the criminal case to its domestic authorities for the purpose of prosecution." See Article 9. The treaty also limits extradition of extraterritorial offenses. For a crime committed in Mexico where the United
States is the requesting Party, the treaty provides that extradition need
be granted only if the laws of Mexico would provide for the punishment
of an extraterritorial offense committed in similar circumstances, or if
the fugitive is a national of the United States. See Article 1(2). The
United States and Mexico agreed to each of these terms in the 1980
exchange of ratifications.
There would be no point to an extradition treaty's elaborate specification of the procedures and standards which the requested country
may require of the requesting country, if those protections could be
freely evaded by the requesting country's employment of armed men to
abduct the defendant.
The suggestion of the United States Attorney,22 and of amicus curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, 23 that the kidnapping of a defendant is permitted by the treaty is also manifestly inconsistent with
the treaty's stated purpose of quashing criminal activity in the two
countries. "Kidnapping" and "abduction" are high on the list of crimes
20. Ley De Extradici6n Internacional, arts. 24-27, El Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n (December 29, 1975), also reprinted in C6DIGOS DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES
(39th ed. 1988). See also Hearings on the Extradition Reform Act of 1981. Before the
Subcommittee on Crime, House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., at
431, 463-64 (1982) (statement of Gisela Von-Muhlenbrock, Legal Specialist, Hispanic
Law Division, Library of Congress) (discussing extradition law in Mexico).
21. Under the 1862 treaty, the United States routinely declined to extradite Americans to Mexico, because of a lack of authority under United States law. See Valentine
v. United States ex reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 13-16 (1936); see also JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, REPORT ON EXTRADITION WITH RETURNS OF ALL CASES 207-08 (1890). The
1899 treaty recast the provision for the surrender of nationals, creating power in the
American Executive to surrender American nationals, but creating no obligation to do
SO.

22. See Opening Brief of Appellant United States, at 18-19, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 90-50459 ("extradition treaties ... limit government authority only
with respect to individuals who are formally extradited pursuant to their terms.").
23. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, at 18, United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 90-50459 ("Any general protection of a nation's sovereignty or any prohibition against kidnapping is simply outside the scope of the
treaty.").
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subject to extradition under the treaty.2 It is startling to suppose that
the treaty allows a treaty party to use abduction, when abduction itself
is announced as a crime subject to extradition and punishment under
the self-same treaty.

This is not the first United States-Mexico extradition treaty. Secretary of State James Blaine, who administered relations under the first

United States-Mexico extradition treaty in the nineteenth century, described the purpose served by the treaty in safeguarding residents from
abrupt and unexplained removals from their own countries.
The treaty of extradition between the United States and Mexico prescribes the
forms for carrying it into effect, and does not authorize either party, for any
cause, to deviate from those forms or arbitrarilyabduct from the territory, of
one party, a person charged with crime, for trial within the jurisdictionof the
25
other.

Secretary of State Thomas Bayard spoke of abductions in the same
light, as a clear violation of the extradition treaty. When Francisco Arresures was seized in Texas by three local deputy sheriffs and a Mexican police officer, and was forced across the border to Mexico without
observing extradition treaty processes, Bayard complained that Ar-

resures' return to Mexico was "obtained not in accordance with, but in

' 26
fraud of existing treaties.

24. 1980 Extradition Treaty, supra note I, art. 2(1) ("Extradition shall take place,
subject to this Treaty, for wilful acts which fall within any of the clauses of the Appendix . . . ."). See Appendix to 1980 Extradition Treaty, cl.
4 (including "Kidnapping;
child stealing; abduction; false imprisonment" as extraditable crimes).
25. Letter of Secretary of State James Blaine to O.M. Roberts, Governor of Texas
(May 3, 1881) (emphasis added), in DOMESTIC LETTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, 1784-1906 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M40, Roll 93); also excerpted in 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (1906).
26. Letter of Secretary of State T.F. Bayard to Thomas C. Manning (February 26,
1887) (emphasis added), in DIPLOMATIC INSTRUCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, 1801-1906, MEXICO (National Archives Microfilm Publication M77, Roll 117).
Secretary of State Bayard denounced the "kidnapping" of Arresures and his "forcible
transportation to Mexico." The hazard for all concerned in the disregard of appropriate
legal process is also illustrated by the Arresures case: Arresures was killed during the
incident in circumstances where his abductors alleged self-defense. Secretary of State
Bayard was skeptical of the claimed self-defense.
See also Statement by Secretary of State George Shultz to the Florida Probation
and Parole Commission, reprinted in Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (1984). Secretary of
State Shultz urged Florida to give early parole to Canadian citizen Sidney L. Jaffe,
following Jaffe's allegation that he was kidnapped by agents of the State of Florida
while in Canadian territory. Observed Secretary Shultz:
The United States has an extradition treaty with Canada. That treaty could
have been utilized to secure Mr. Jaffe's return ....
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Secretary Blaine and Secretary Bayard's view is confirmed by common sense. It is the central premise of an extradition treaty that each
country's exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory will be respected.
Otherwise, there would be no need for formal extradition in the first
place-bands of Mexican police could invade Texas to recapture Mexican or American fugitives, and vice versa. According to Samuel Spear:
The necessity for extradition grows out of the fact that, except in cases specially provided for by treaty, the penal laws of one country cannot operate
within the jurisdiction of another. The sovereignty of a nation within its own
territory is exclusive and absolute ....
"In truth, the criminal, by his flight to
another State, becomes (although but for a time) the subject of the supreme
power of that State, and immediately enjoys the protection and guardianship of
that State. From that guardianshiphe cannot be forcibly taken, except under
special agreement, the terms of which, we presume, certainly do not extend further than to those very grounds on which the surrender was demanded and
granted."" '

The language of the 1980 extradition treaty expressly recognizes the
territorial jurisdiction of each contracting party in Article 4(1):
For the purposes of this Treaty, the territory of a Contracting Party shall include
all the territory under the jurisdiction of that Contracting Party, including airspace and territorial waters and vessels and aircraft registered in that Contracting Party if any such aircraft is in flight when the offense is committed.

Similarly, Article 20 of the 1980 extradition treaty expressly recognizes
the right of each country to deny the other access to its own national

territory except in accordance with the treaty. Article 20(1) notes that
"The right to transport through the territory of one of the Contracting
Parties a person who is not a national of that Contracting Party surrendered to the other Contracting Party by a third State shall be granted

on presentation made through the diplomatic channel of a certified
copy of the decision on extradition, provided that reasons of public order are not opposed to the transit."2 8
As no good reason appears why the extradition treaty was not utilized to secure Mr. Jaffe's return, it is perfectly understandable that the Government of
Canada is outraged by his alleged kidnapping, which Canada considers a violation of the treaty and of international law, as well as an affront to its
sovereignty.
Id. (emphasis added).
27.

See SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 70-74 (Albany 1884) (cit-

ing Dutch jurist Kluit).
28. 1980 Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 20(1) (emphasis added). The first
United States-Mexico extradition treaty followed lengthy negotiations between the
United States and Mexico. Its preamble also clearly recognized the territorial sovereignty of each of the signatories:
The United States of America and the United Mexican States, having judged
it expedient, with a view to the better administration of justice and to the preven-
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The 1980 extradition treaty also explicitly recognizes that the deci-

sion of the territorial sovereign is final, and that no foreign seizure of a
person may take place on Mexican territory without the consent of
competent Mexican authorities. Article 14 provides that:
.- The requested Party shall promptly communicate to the requesting Party
its decision on the request for extradition.
2.-In the case of complete or partial rejection of a request for extradition, the
requested Party shall give the reasons on which it was based.
3.-If the extradition is granted, the surrender of the person sought shall take
place within such time as may be prescribed by the laws of the requested Party.
The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties shall agree on the date and
place of the surrender of the person sought.2"

The United States Attorney claims the absence of any article in the
treaty stating in haec verba that the national territory of the treaty

parties will be respected. But every article of the treaty takes this as its
premise. According to the United States Attorney, the more fundamen-

tal an understanding is to the treaty regime, the less it may be enforced
under the treaty's remedies. This is Alice-in-Wonderland logic.
An extradition treaty sets the conditions under which a foreign state
may demand as of right the surrender of a fugitive criminal from the
domestic territory of another state. Protection of the contracting states'

sovereignty and territoriality lies at the treaty's very core. Where a
state promises to surrender fugitives under certain specified conditions,
the treaty parties have plainly agreed that fugitives need not be surrendered when those conditions are not met. As the Supreme Court noted
in Factor v. Laubenheimer, "the principles of international law recog-

nize no right to extradition apart from treaty.
century, international
observed,

law

'30

scholar Theodore

In the mid-nineteenth
Woolsey

similarly

no nation is bound to administer the laws of another, or to aid in administering
them . . . the definitions of crime vary so much in different nations, that a consent to deliver up all accused fugitives to the authorities at home for trial, would
often violate the feeling of justice or of humanity. Some have contended for an
absolute obligation to deliver up fugitives from justice; but (I.) The number of
treaties of extradition, if nothing more, would show at least that no such obligation is generally recognized. Else what need of treaties giving consent to such
tion of crime within their respective territories and jurisdictions, that persons
charged with the crimes hereinafter enumerated, and being fugitives from justice, should, under certain circumstances, be reciprocally delivered up, have resolved to conclude a Treaty for this purpose . ...
1862 Extradition Treaty, supra note 19, preamble (emphasis added); accord 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 19, preamble.
29. 1980 Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 14 (emphasis added).
30. 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).

1991]

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

extradition, and specifying crimes for which the fugitive should be delivered
31
up?

The good faith with which extradition treaties are to be read was
emphasized in United States v. Rauscher.-2 There, a prisoner was sur-

rendered from Great Britain to the United States on a charge of murder under the provisions of Article 10 of the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty.3 3 The prisoner, William Rauscher, was convicted in a United
States circuit court on the lesser offense of cruelly punishing a crew
member, a charge on which he had not been formally surrendered by
Great Britain. The Solicitor General argued to the Court that the
treaty contained no language expressly prohibiting the United States to
try the defendant on the second charge once he was in custody and
advanced that express language was prerequisite. The Court rejected
the Government's claim on the ground that to allow trial on a second
unscrutinized offense would undercut all the safeguards of the treaty
concerning evidence, pre-extradition hearing before a judge or magis-

trate, and exclusion of political offenses. Said the Court:
this right of transfer, the right to demand it, the obligation to grant it, the proceedings under which it takes place, all show that it is for a limited and defined

31.

THEODORE WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

179 (1860) (emphasis in original).
32. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
33. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, United States-Great Britain (signed August 9,
1842, entered into force October 13, 1842), 8 Stat. 572, T.S. No. 119. The WebsterAshburton Treaty was captioned a "Treaty to Settle and Define the Boundaries Between the Territories of the United States and the Possessions of Her Britannic Majesty in North America, for the Final Suppression of the African Slave-Trade, and for
the Giving Up of Criminals Fugitive from Justice, in Certain Cases." Article 10 states:
It is agreed that the United States and Her Britannic Majesty shall, upon
mutual requisitions by them, or their Ministers, officers, or authorities, respectively made, deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with the crime
of murder, or assault with intent to commit murder, or piracy, or arson, or robbery, or forgery, or the utterance of forged paper, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum, or shall be found, within the territories of the
other: provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of criminality as,
according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall
be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime
or offence had there been committed: and the respective judges and other magistrates of the two Governments shall have power, jurisdiction, and authority, upon
complaint made under oath, to issue a warrant for the apprehension of the fugitive or person so charged, that he may be brought before such judges and other
magistrates, respectively, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be
heard and considered; and if, on such hearing, the evidence be deemed sufficient
to sustain the charge, it shall be the duty of the examining judge or magistrate to
certify the same to the proper Executive authority, that a warrant may issue for
the surrender of such fugitive. The expense of such apprehension and delivery
shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition. and receives
the fugitive.
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purpose that the transfer is made, it is impossible to conceive of the exercise of
jurisdiction in such a case for any other purpose than that mentioned in the
treaty, and ascertained by the proceedings under which the party is extradited,
without an implication of fraud upon the rights of the party extradited, and of
bad faith to the country which permitted his extradition. No such view of solemn
public treaties between the great nations of the earth can be sustained by a tribunal called upon to give judicial construction to them.
The opposite view has been attempted to be maintained in this country upon
the ground that there is no express limitation in the treaty of the right of the
country in which the offence was committed to try the person for the crime alone
for which he was extradited, and that once being within the jurisdiction of that
country, no matter by what contrivance or fraud or by what pretence of establishing a charge provided for by the extradition treaty he may have been brought
within the jurisdiction, he is, when here, liable to be tried for any offence against
the laws as though arrested here originally. This proposition of the absence of
express restriction in the treaty of the right to try him for other offences than
that for which he was extradited, is met by the manifest scope and object of the
treaty itself.3 '

The Rauscher Court concluded that the promise not to try an extradited defendant on unscrutinized offenses was inherent in the treaty
itself-rejecting the Government's claim even in that case that express
language should be required to preclude trial on a second offense.
The United States Attorney would have it that the rule of Rau-

scher-barring trial on charges that have not been subjected to the
scrutiny of the extradition process, where the foreign government has

objected-applies only where the defendant has been formally extradited on an initial charge: the foreign country's act of surrendering the

defendant is said to consummate an implied "contract" not to try him
on other charges.3 5 But this flouts the fact that the extradition treaty is
also a contract. Rauscher's logic applies with as full force where the
treaty is being flouted altogether. In 1980 Mexico acceded to treaty
obligations which it could have declined, and in consideration, gained a
promise by the United States to observe the same treaty. An "implica-

tion of fraud" and "of bad faith" would accrue equally to the one disregard of the treaty as the other.
34. 119 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added).
35. See Opening Brief of Appellant United States, at 11, United States v. AlvarezMachain, No. 90-50459 (9th Cir. 1990) ("When its terms are invoked, the Extradition
Treaty (like any other contract) may limit the power of the requesting state to punish a
fugitive surrendered under the Treaty. However, where no 'contract' of extradition is
formed pursuant to the Extradition Treaty, the Treaty cannot create any duties on the
part of either of the signatories, much less confer any rights on a criminal defendant.")
(emphasis in original).
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The same principle in interpreting treaties, to give force to the full
understanding of the parties, was observed in Cook v. United States,"'
a case concerning American seizure of a foreign vessel for a smuggling

offense, beyond one hour from shore. The Solicitor General suggested
that the treaty with Great Britain did not contain any explicit language
promising that the United States would refrain from seizing British
vessels this far out from shore. The treaty, said the Solicitor General,
only promised that Great Britain would "not protest" seizures within
the one hour range. The American Coast Guard's power to seize vessels
up to twelve miles from shore had even been recognized in an earlier
Congressional statute. The Supreme Court rejected this crabbed reading of the treaty:
First. It is suggested on behalf of the Government that the power to search and
seize within the twelve-mile zone conferred upon officers of the Coast Guard by
§ 581 of the Tariff Act of 1922, was unaffected by the Treaty, save that the
British Government agreed not to protest where the seizure was within an hour's
sailing distance of the coast. The argument is that the Treaty settled the validity
of the seizure only for those cases where it was made within the limits described
in the Treaty; and that since this seizure was made beyond one hour's sailing
distance from the coast the Treaty did not apply.3 7 In construing the Treaty its
history should be consulted. Compare United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1;
Oklahoma v. Texas, 260 U.S. 606; Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52. Both its
language and its history show that the high contractingpartiesdid not intend so
to limit its operation. The preamble states that they entered into the Treaty
"being desirous of avoiding any difficulties which might arise between them in
connection with the laws in force in the United States on the subject of alcoholic
beverages." The history reveals that serious differences had arisen between the
two Governments in that connection; and that, for the purpose of resolving them,
the parties determined to deal completely with the subject of search and seizure,
beyond our territorial limits, of British vessels suspected of smuggling liquors.'
36. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
37. The Cook Court noted, in footnote, that the narrowing reading of the treaty
"was advanced by the Solicitor General as representing the view not of the Department
of Justice but of other lawyers for the Government." 288 U.S. at 112 n.3.
38. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. at 111-12 (emphasis added). The origin of the
United States-Mexico extradition treaties in the need to settle affairs along the border
is also apparent. Seeking an extradition treaty in 1850, President Millard Fillmore said
to the Senate, "[t]he length of the boundary line between the two countries, extending
as it does from the Pacific to the Gulf, renders such a convention indispensable to the
maintenance of good order and the amicable relations now so happily subsisting between the sister republics." Statement of Millard Fillmore, July 20, 1850, quoted in
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION,

supra note 20, at 97. See also THEODORE WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 31, at 180 ("We conclude that there is a qualified

duty of nations to assist each other's criminal justice, which only special treaties, expressing the views of the parties at the time. can define.") (emphasis added).
Cf. Case of 1881, in JOHN BASSETr MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION, supra note 19, at 287 ("Texas sheriff, accompanied by three
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Under the United States Attorney's view, a foreign ship would have
more treaty protection than a foreign citizen. The Supreme Court's regard for the full understanding of the treaty is even more striking, since
in Cook, the Congress had previously authorized seizures beyond onehour's sail. In the instant case, the seizure of a foreign citizen on his
own soil has never been authorized by the Congress. The burden of a
"clear statement" rule all the more strikingly falls upon the
Government.
The history of United States-Mexico extradition treaties evidences at
least two purposes:
(1) The state parties have sought increasing national and judicial
safeguards in scrutinizing fugitive surrender.
(2) The state parties have relied upon renegotiation of the terms of
the treaty when existing arrangements were inadequate.
The increasing concern for national and judicial scrutiny of fugitive
surrenders may be seen in the gradual exclusion of local border authorities from the extradition process. In the 1862 treaty, surrender of fugitives could be made through diplomatic channels or, in the case of
crimes committed in border states or territories of the two countries,
through civil authorities of the border states and territories or even of
local border districts and counties; when civil authority was suspended,
the requisition could be made through the chief military officer in command of the border state or territory."' In the 1899 treaty, the compemen, had crossed from Tombstone, Arizona, into Mexico, and there captured a fugitive
criminal, whom they had taken back into Arizona without any form of law." Secretary
of State requested Secretary of Interior "to direct that proper measures be taken by the
Territorial authorities for the punishment of any guilty parties, and for the future
maintenance of law and treaty obligations in such matters." Mexico did not request
release of criminal.) (emphasis added); see also Note of Mexican Minister Zamacona
to Secretary of State James Blaine (July 25, 1881), in NOTES FROM THE MEXICAN
LEGATION TO UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1821-1906 (National Archives

Microfilm Publication M54, roll 19) (Tombstone sheriff and three men returned with
fugitive from Mexico "without complying with the formalities prescribed by the extradition treaty."); Note from Secretary of State James Blaine to Mexican Minister

Zamacona (August 2, 1881), in

NOTES TO FOREIGN LEGATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1834-1906, MEXICO (National Archives Micro-

film Publication M99, roll 71) (Secretary of Interior will direct territorial authorities to
punish any guilty parties and take measures "for the future maintenance of law and
treaty obligations in such matters.").
39. 1862 Extradition Treaty, supra note 19, art. 2:
In the case of crimes committed in the frontier States or Territories of the two
contracting parties, requisitions may be made through their respective diplomatic
agents, or through the chief civil authority of said States or Territories, or
through such chief civil or judicial authority of the districts or counties bordering
on the frontier as may for this purpose be duly authorized by the said chief civil
authority of the said frontier States or Territories, or when from any cause the

1991]

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

tence of border authorities was reduced; according to Article 9, an ini-

tial demand for surrender could

be presented to and initial

apprehension of the fugitive could be made by border civil or military

authorities, but, before surrender could proceed, a record of judicial
examination of the fugitive
shall be forwarded to the proper executive authority of the United States of
America or of the United Mexican States, as the case may be; when it is found
by such respective executive authority that, according to the law and the evidence, the extradition is due pursuant to the terms of this convention, the fugitive may be given up according to the forms of law prescribed in such cases.' 0

The 1980 Treaty eliminated any delegation of authority to border offi-

cials. Extradition demands must be presented through diplomatic channels, though either party may request a provisional arrest by the na-

tional authorities in cases of "urgency." 41 Under Article 13, which
incorporates the statutory law of each country, surrenders must be preceded by judicial scrutiny.

In the course of the treaty relationship, the scope of crimes subject to
extradition also has been modified and expanded by supplementary

agreements. In 1903, a supplementary convention added the crime of
bribery to the crimes subject to extradition."2 In 1926, another supple-

mentary convention added "[c]rimes and offenses against the laws for
the suppression of the traffic in and use of narcotic drugs," smuggling,
and crimes involving injurious or poisonous chemicals. 41 In 1941, a
third supplementary convention added the criminal acts of "an acces44
sory before or after the fact."

By its plain language, structure, and history, the 1980 Extradition
Treaty clearly contemplates that the treaty parties will not seek to

evade its terms by sponsoring abductions of the other's citizens. The
civil authority of such State or territory shall be suspended, through the chief
military officer in command of such State or Territory.
Article 4 states that:
On the part of each country the surrender of fugitives from justice shall be
made only by the authority of the Executive thereof, except in the case of crimes
committed within the limits of the frontier States or Territories, in which latter
case the surrender may be made by the chief civil authority thereof, or such chief
civil or judicial authority of the districts or counties bordering on the frontier as
may for this purpose be duly authorized by the said chief civil authority of the
said frontier States or Territories, or if from any cause the civil authority of such
State or Territory shall be suspended, then such surrender may be made by the
chief military officer in command of such State or Territory.
40. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 19, art. 9.
41. 1980 Extradition Treaty, supra note 1,arts. 10 & 11.
42. 1903 Supplementary Convention, supra note 19.
43. 1926 Supplementary Extradition Convention, supra note 19, art. 1.
44. 1941 Supplementary Extradition Convention, supra note 19, art. 1.
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United States Attorney has offered no evidence from the negotiating
record, ratification process, or later communications with Mexico to
support the suggestion that any different understanding was reached
with Mexico.45
American drug enforcement agents need not breach United States
treaty promises if present treaty terms are unsatisfactory, 40 for the
treaty terms can be renegotiated. The ex post facto clause does not
limit extradition treaties. A renegotiated treaty can be applied to

crimes and offenses committed previously. 47 Mexican law also seems to
allow the Mexican government to grant extradition beyond the scope of
the treaty; the treaty serves to define what the United States may de-

mand as of right; the statute further describes what the Mexican national government may allow as a matter of discretion.48 In such cases,
the Mexican statute provides procedural protections for the fugitive
comparable to those in a treaty request, and requires that the request-

ing country be willing to surrender fugitives in like circumstances. 41 In
American law, delivery of foreign fugitives outside the requirements of
the treaty would require statutory authority from the Congress, except

where a fugitive may be subject to deportation under American immi45. A letter drafted after the event by the newly appointed Legal Advisor to the
State Department is no substitute for this missing evidence. See Addendum of the Appellant United States at 68, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 90-50459 (9th Cir.
1990) (reproducing Letter from Edwin D. Williamson to Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh (Sept. 26, 1990)).
46. It should not be overlooked that the United States never submitted any request
to Mexico for the legal extradition of Alvarez-Machain under the treaty. Here, there is
no basis to conclude that Mexico would not have cooperated with an extradition request made pursuant to the procedural safeguards of the treaty, including an emergency arrest under Article 11, if there appeared to be danger of flight before the evidence could be provided.
47. See. e.g., 1980 Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 22(1) ("This Treaty shall
apply to offenses specified in Article 2 committed before and after this Treaty enters
into force."); see also Supplementary Extradition Treaty, United States-United Kingdom (signed June 25, 1985; entered into force Dec. 23, 1986), - UST ., TIAS No.
-,
24 I.L.M. 1105-09 (1985) (excluding murder, aircraft hijacking, and abduction
from the political offense exception; treaty applies to crimes committed before and after treaty entered into force, except where conduct was not an offense under the laws of
the parties at the time of its commission); see also SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM, S.

ExEc. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); In re De Giacomo, 12 Blatch. 391, 7
F. Cas. 366 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 3,747), discussed in SAMUEL SPEAR, THE LAW
OF EXTRADITION, supra note 27, at 35-36.
48. Ley De Extradici6n Internacional, arts. 1, 2, 14, 16 & 36, El Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n (Dec. 29, 1975), also reprinted in C6DIGOS DE PROCEDIMIENTOS
PENALES, supra note 20, at 36.
49. Id., art. 10.
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gration laws. 50 The resort to kidnapping by agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration thus bypassed other available routes for
seeking effective prosecution of foreign fugitives.81
B. Transborderabduction by a state party bars personaljurisdiction
over the abducted individual.
The view that American extradition treaties forbid the exercise of
criminal jurisdiction when state-sponsored abduction has been used by
a state party to obtain the defendant and the foreign state has objected,
is supported by the authoritative Harvard Research in International
Law.5 2 This project-directed by Manley 0. Hudson, professor of law
at Harvard Law School, later judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and Chairman of the International Law Commission--examined three topics from 1932 to 1935: Extradition, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, and the Law of Treaties. The Advisory
Committee to the project was chaired by George W. Wickersham, former Attorney General of the United States and President of the American Law Institute, and included other experienced figures in international and American law, including Frederic R. Coudert, Esq.; Green
H. Hackworth, Legal Advisor of the Department of State; Judge
Learned Hand of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit; former Secretary of State Elihu Root; and James Brown Scott,
president of the American Society of International Law, director of the
Division of International Law of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and later Legal Advisor to the Department of State.
The Official Reporter for the Harvard study of Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime was Professor Edwin D. Dickinson, professor of international law at the University of California at Berkeley. The Reporter's
standard for criminal jurisdiction read as follows:
50. See Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 9 (1936) ("the
Constitution creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual.
Proceedings against him must be authorized by law. There is no executive discretion to
surrender him to a foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by law .... It
must be found that statute or treaty confers the power.").
51. Upon the repatriation of defendant Alvarez-Machain to Mexico pursuant to
Judge Rafeedie's order, the United States also could request the Government of Mexico to detain Alvarez-Machain under Articles 9 and 11 of the 1980 Extradition Treaty,
while legally sufficient documentation for his lawful extradition is assembled and sub-

mitted to the Mexican government and courts by the United States. Judge Rafeedie
did not grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, and hence the charges
against Alvarez-Machain can be further prosecuted when custody of him is legally

obtained.
52.

Harvard Research in International Law, 29 At. J. INT'L L. I (Supp. 1935).
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Article 16. Apprehension in Violation of International Law
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or
punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to
its authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States
whose rights have been violated by such measures."

The Reporter's Comment noted as follows:
In the United States, for example, the law is in accord with this article in cases
in which a person has been brought within the country by recourse to measures
in violation of an internationalconvention."

The Reporter cited Cook v. United States,55 Ford v. United States,5"
and United States v. Rauscher,57 and remarked the "noteworthy language" of United States v. Ferris8 that described the "complete lack

of jurisdiction" in cases where a person was seized by a state party in
59
violation of an international convention.
In United States v. Cook, as we have seen, the Supreme Court declined the Solicitor General's suggestion that the United States was

free to seize a British vessel for smuggling beyond a one-hour limit
from shore merely for want of express language in the treaty with the
British. ° The Supreme Court went on to find that the federal courts
shared responsibility to enforce the treaty's implicit jurisdictional limits. The illegal seizure in violation of the treaty deprived the District
Court of jurisdiction over the vessel, even though the Court could have
taken jurisdiction of an attempt to smuggle goods into the United
States pursuant to a legal seizure. The Supreme Court rejected the Solicitor General's suggestion that one should distinguish between the initial illegal custody by the Coast Guard that effected the seizure and
subsequent custody by the marshal of the District Court:
Our Government, lacking power to seize, lacked power, because of the Treaty, to
subject the vessel to our laws. To hold that adjudicationmay follow a wrongful
seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty. Compare
61
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407.

As Reporter Dickinson noted of this case:
53.
added).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 52, at 623 (emphasis
Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
288 U.S. 102 (1933).
273 U.S. 593 (1927).
119 U.S. 407 (1886).
19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
Harvard Research in InternationalLaw, supra note 52, at 624.
288 U.S. at 121-22.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Lacking the power to seize, in consequence of the treaty, the United States had
no power to subject the vessel to its laws. The objection was not to the jurisdiction of the court alone, but to "the jurisdiction of the United States." The objection was not met by seeking to distinguish between the custody of the Coast
Guard and the subsequent custody of the marshall of the court, nor was the
defect of jurisdiction cured by an answer to the merits on the part of the individual claimant. The Supreme Court concluded that "to hold that adjudication may
follow a wrongful seizure would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the
treaty. . . . The ordinary incidents of possession of the vessel and the cargo,"
said the court, "yield to the international agreement." '

Similarly, United States v. Ferris involved the attempted prosecution
of members of the crew of a Panamanian flag vessel for conspiracy to
violate the United States Prohibition and Tariff Acts, where the ship
and crew members had been seized 270 miles off the west coast of the
United States. 3 In sustaining the individual defendants' objections to
the jurisdiction of the District Court over their persons, Judge Bourquin said:
Hence, as the instant seizure was far outside the limit [of one hour's sail from
shore], it is sheer aggression and trespass (like those which contributed to the
War of 1812), contrary to the treaty, not to be sanctioned by any court, and
cannot be the basis of any proceeding adverse to defendants. The prosecution
contends, however, that courts will try those before it, regardless of the methods
employed to bring them there. There are many cases generally so holding, but
none of authority wherein a treaty or other federal law was violated, as in the
case at bar. That presents a very different aspect and case. "A decent respect for
the opinions of mankind," national honor, harmonious relations between nations,
and avoidance of war, require that the contracts and law represented by treaties
62. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 52, at 625. Secretary of
State Hamilton Fish took a similar view-that illegal abduction bars subsequent jurisdiction-in the case of Peter Martin, who was forcibly taken from American soil by
Canadian law enforcement officers without fulfilling any of the safeguards of the extradition treaty. Said Fish, "the recapture and removal of the prisoner from the jurisdiction of the United States to British soil was an illegal, violent and forcible act, which
cannot justify the subsequent proceedings whereby he has been. is. or may be restrained of his liberty." See Note from Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to British
Minister Edward Thornton (Jan. 10, 1877) (emphasis added), in NOTES TO FOREIGN
LEGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1834-1906,

GREAT BRITAIN (National Archives Microfilm Publication M99, Roll 46). See also
Notes from Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to British Minister Edward Thornton
(Nov. 2, 1876, Dec. 6, 1876), in id.; Case of Peter Martin, in I JOHN BAsSErT MOORE,
A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION, supra note 19. at 286; also

in 1877 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 266-71 (naturalized American
citizen Peter Martin convicted of assault in British Columbia, and conveyed by Canadian officials through American territory in Alaska en route to place of confinement in
Victoria. While on American soil Martin attacked one of his Canadian custodians, was
recaptured by other Canadian enforcement agents on American territory, and taken to
Victoria, British Columbia, leading to Secretary Fish's complaint.).
63. 19 F.2d at 926 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
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shall be scrupulously observed, held inviolate, and in good faith precisely per'
formed-require that treaties shall not be reduced to mere "scraps of paper."'

Judge Bourquin further explained:
It seems clear that, if one legally before the court cannot be tried because therein
a treaty is violated [as in Rauscher], for greater reason one illegally before the
court, in violation of a treaty, likewise cannot be subjected to trial. Equally in
both cases is there absence of jurisdiction.6

This reading of the extradition treaty is not only faithful to its text
and intention. It also will aid the safety of American citizens, as much
as Mexican nationals. As the history of our relations with Mexico and
Canada make clear, abductions can occur in both directions across a
border. Under Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution, as under Arti-

cle VI of the United States Constitution, treaties are made the supreme
law of the land." Where a court declines to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, because the defendant was forcibly brought
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. (emphasis added). Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen also recognized that personal jurisdiction over a defendant is barred where an extradition treaty's
protections are fundamentally breached and the other nation protests. Mexican citizen
Jos6 Segura was indicted in Texas for homicide, then fled to Mexico. Agents hired by
the state of Texas seized Segura in Mexico and brought him back to the United States
"without observance of the requisites of the extradition treaties with Mexico," complained the Secretary of State to the Governor of Texas.
I need hardly repeat to you . .. that such proceedings are entirely unwarranted, and afford to the Mexican Government just ground for complaint of violation of international laws and comity, and expectation of redress. By the Constitution of the United States, the treaties executed by the general government
are the Supreme law of the land, and to be respected as such by the several
States as well as by the federal authorities. This supremacy in the present case
could be recognized and enforced if the courts of Texas, whose duty it is to obey
the supreme law, were to treat criminals brought before them under such circumstances as not properly within their jurisdiction, and refuse to take cognizance of the charge against them until it could be shown that the accused had
come into the judicial power of the court after lawful process of arrest.
I trust that your response will enable me to set the matter in a better light to
the Mexican Minister than his note presents it in.
See Letter of Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen to O.M. Roberts, Governor of

Texas (February 5, 1883) (emphasis added), in

DOMESTIC LETTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1784-1906 (National Archives Microfilm Publication M40, Roll 97);
also cited in 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

25, at 330.
66. See CONSTITUTION OF MEXICO, art. 133, reprinted in 10 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1988):
This Constitution, the laws of the Congress of the Union which emanate therefrom, and all treaties made, or which shall be made in accordance therewith by
the President of the Republic, with the approval of the Senate, shall be the Supreme Law throughout the Union. The judges of every State shall be bound to
the said Constitution, the laws, and treaties, notwithstanding any contradictory
provisions that may appear in the constitution or laws of the States.
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before the court in violation of a treaty obligation, the court merely

07
fulfills its obligation not to commit an international delict.
The United States Attorney and amicus Criminal Justice Legal

Foundation err in characterizing the treaty's limits on personal juris' Rather, it is a matter
diction as a question of "implying" a "remedy." 68

of a court's traditional responsibility to ascertain its own jurisdiction, a

task at the center of the judicial function. It is a question set by the
treaty as law of the land, and the courts' duty to assure that they do

not exercise jurisdiction in violation of the law.
The intimate involvement of the judiciary in the administration of
extradition treaties has been set by the Congress itself, which delegates
to federal judges the authority to refuse extradition if the required factual showing and legal requisites of the extradition treaty are not satis-

fied.6 9 The involvement of the federal judiciary in the process of extradition became an axiom of our jurisprudence following the Adams
administration's near debacle in the famous incident of Jonathan Robbins in 1799, in which, Jeffersonian Republicans suggested, a Cabinet
officer sought to extradite an individual without full judicial review of
the merits.7 ° The statute passed by the Congress in 1848, now codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 3184, established the centrality of the judiciary in
guarding the process of extradition. 7 '
67.

Cf.PETER Du PONCEAU,

A

DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF

3 (Philadelphia 1824) (emphasis omitted):
The law of nations, being the common law of the civilised world, may be said.
indeed, to be a part of the law of every civilised nation.... It is binding on every
people and on every government. It is to be carried into effect at all times under
the penalty of being thrown out of the pale of civilisation, or involving the country into a war. Every branch of the national administration, each within its district and its particular jurisdiction is bound to administer it. . . .Whether there
is or not a national common law in other respects, this universal common law can
never cease to be the rule of executive and judicial proceedings until mankind
shall return to the savage state.
68. Opening Brief of Appellant United States, at 17-18, and Brief of Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, at 21, United States v. Alvarez-Machain. No.
90-50459 (9th Cir. 1990).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
70. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J.) (Robbins
incident led to "perception that extradition without judicial oversight was 'highly dangerous to liberty and ought never to be allowed in this country." '); Wedgwood, The
Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229 (1990).
71. The centrality of the courts in enforcing extradition treaties is also shown by
the suggestions of Secretaries of State and Attorneys General that a defendant should
seek a judicial remedy before resorting to diplomatic recourse. See Case of Edward
Underwood, in 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. supra
note 25, at 318 (prisoner extradited from Canada on murder charge, acquitted, then
rearrested and convicted on two charges of robbery. British ambassador was advised by
the United States that "as the question was qf a judicial nature, there were no steps tu
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES
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Only the President, not the Drug Enforcement Administration, may

enjoy the power to terminate, suspend, or denounce a treaty obligation
of the United States. Until then, the courts enjoy full competence and
retain the responsibility to observe such treaty obligations in cases
brought before them.

2

C. Ker v. Illinois is not to the contrary. United States v. Noriega is
wholly distinct, for Panama did not object to the arrest of Noriega.

Transfer of defendants among States of the Union enjoys lesser safeguards than internationalextradition.

Ker v. Illinois was decided the same day as Rauscher, and written
by the same Justice, Samuel Miller. The eminent constitutional histo-

rian Professor Charles Fairman of Harvard University noted in his famous article Ker v. Illinois Revisited,"3 that Ker came before the Su-

preme Court upon the limited scope of review permitted by a writ of
error.7 The Court's construction of the treaty was limited to considering the precise claim made by counsel for United States citizen Ker
that he had a right of asylum in Peru despite the apparent willingness
of the government of Peru to have him be tried in the United States for
financial crimes committed on American soil. A review of the diplomatic notes received from Peru between January 1, 1883 through January 1, 1887 shows no objection was made by Peru to the exercise of
be taken to fulfill the obligations of the treaty except through the appropriatejudicial
proceedings") (emphasis added); accord Opinion of Attorney General John W. Griggs
(Mar. 27, 1901), 23 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 431, 434.
See also Case of Henry Acosta, in 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25, at 318-19 n.; and in Opinion of Attorney General Philander Knox (Dec. 24, 1901), 23 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 604, 607 (defendant Acosta extradited
from Mexico for offense, convicted, served sentence, and on day of release was rearrested for another offense committed prior to his extradition. Attorney General Knox
said, "I do not mean to intimate that his only resort is to the courts, or that if they
deny him any rights which he may possess, the Federal Government is powerless or
free from obligation to interfere .... My present opinion is only intended to intimate
that his primary resort is to the courts.") (emphasis added).
72. See The Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99
(1884):
a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens
or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territorial limits of the other,
which partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country .... A treaty, then,
is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions prescribe a
rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.
73. Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 682 (1953).
74. See Revised Statutes § 709 (1875).
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criminal jurisdiction by the Illinois courts in Ker7 5 Equally important,
at the time that Ker was seized in Lima, that city was occupied by the

armed forces of Chile. Chile invaded Peru as part of the War of the
Pacific, and the government of Peru had been displaced in Lima for

over eighteen months by the foreign occupying forces. The Pinkerton
agent who was seeking Ker applied to Admiral Lynch of the Chilean
forces occupying Lima, and the Admiral agreed to release defendant
Ker to the Pinkerton man for return to the United States."6 As Professor Fairman noted:
On April 3, 1883, when Ker was seized in Lima, war existed between Peru and
Chile-the War of the Pacific out of which grew the Tacna-Arica dispute. Chilian [sic] forces had occupied Lima. Admiral Patrick Lynch, soldier of fortune
serving in the Chilian Navy, had been appointed military governor. On September 28, 1881, he had ousted the provisional government theretofore conducted by
the Peruvian, Dr. Calderon. "The authority of the legitimate power having in
fact passed into the hands of the occupant," the military governor was indeed
the authority competent to surrendera fugitive present in the occupied territory.
. . . Accepting as accurate the factual recital of the [Illinois] Attorney General,

there was no invasion of Peruvian sovereignty or other breach of international
7
7

law.

Even after the surrender of defendant Ker by Chilean Admiral Lynch,
the Peruvian government of Dr. Calderon filed no protest against the

exercise of jurisdiction by United States courts.
Here, in contrast, the government of Mexico has consistently objected to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the United States, and
has demanded the return of the defendant Alvarez-Machain. Unlike
Ker, Alvarez-Machain was not surrendered by any foreign occupying
power; the Mexican national government retains full sovereignty over
the territory of Mexico under international law.

In addition, Ker involved a private Pinkerton agent who had been
authorized by the federal government and the State of Illinois only to
make a formal treaty demand on the government of Peru. The Pinker75. See NOTES FROM THE LEGATION OF PERU, 1827-1906 (National Archives Microfilm Publication T802); see also Ker v. Illinois, 110 111.627, 640 (1884) (Scott, J.),
affd 119 U.S. 436 (1886) ("if the government of Peru does not complain of the arrest

of defendant within its jurisdiction, as an infraction of international law, it does not lie
in the mouth of defendant to make complaint on its behalf.") (emphasis added); id. at
643 ("Whether a nation will surrender a fugitive from justice that seeks with it an
asylum, is a question of national comity resting in discretion. In no view that can be
taken is defendant entitled to immunity .... ").
76. See Statement of George Hunt, Attorney General of Illinois. in Brief for Defendant in Error, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), reprinted in Fairman. supra
note 73, at 684-85.
77. Fairman, supra note 73, at 685-86 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
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ton agent's action in obtaining custody of Ker, by treating with the
occupying forces of the government of Chile, was undertaken without
the knowledge or authority of prosecuting authorities of either Illinois
or the United States government. Here, in contrast, the District Court

found that the informant's actions in arranging to abduct AlvarezMachain were undertaken with the prior knowledge, approval, and
promised reward of Special Agents of the United States Drug Enforce-

ment Administration.

8

Finally, in Ker v. Illinois, the extradition treaty reserved to Peru no

discretion to refuse delivery, except for the required evidentiary showing. Ker was an American national charged for a larceny committed on

American soil. 79 In the instant case, the United States agreed in 1980
that Mexico and the United States alike retained the right to decline to

surrender their own nationals. In addition, the 1980 treaty permits extradition for the first time for extraterritorial offenses, similar to that
charged by the United States against Mexican citizen AlvarezMachain for a murder on Mexican soil-but only where it has been
demonstrated that in a like circumstance, Mexican law would permit
prosecution of a similar extraterritorial offense."
This case is also wholly distinct from the matter of General Manuel
Noriega and Luis Del Cid who were brought to the United States following their capture in the United States invasion of Panama. First,
and crucially, the Government of the Republic of Panama has not objected in any form to the seizure and arrest of these two defendants,
nor has it suggested there was any violation of Panamanian sover78. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, et al., 745 F. Supp. at 603 & n.7. Lower
court decisions since Ker have concerned situations apparently distinct from the present
case: either the foreign government made no protest under the extradition treaty, or a
private individual acted on his own without prior authorization from United States
officials. For example, in the 1905 incident of Antonio Martinez, see Opening Brief of
Appellant United States at 43 n., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. 90-50459
(9th Cir. 1990), the fugitive was taken from Mexico by a private party. The abductor,
Antonio Felix, was extradited by the United States to Mexico for full punishment-hardly imaginable if the abduction had been carried out at the request of
United States officials. As Hackworth observes, the Martinez case fell into the distinct
category of "breaches by private persons." See 2 G.H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 152, at 321 (1941).
79. See Brief for Defendant in Error, at 17-19, Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886):
The effect upon Ker of the acts complained of is identical with what would have
happened to him if Peru had discharged her treaty obligation ....
If every act,
from the moment of his capture, is declared illegal, and Ker returned to the
place whence he was taken, it will, at that instant, be the duty of Peru to surrender him to the United States for trial. Two more trips across the sea would be
the outcome to Ker of this extraordinary venture.
80. See 1980 Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, art. 1(2) & 9.
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eignty. The United States has placed this fact on the record in the
Miami prosecution pending against Noriega and Del Cid.8 1 Secondly,
the armed forces of the United States, acting pursuant to Presidential
order, openly occupied the capital city and territory of Panama at the

time Noriega and Del Cid were apprehended; ordinary treaty relations
were thus arguably suspended.8 2

The facts and law of the case of Alvarez-Machain arise under the
bilateral United States-Mexico treaty, and are also distinct from American domestic removal of a defendant from, for example, the state of
Texas to the state of California. The domestic transfer of defendants
within the American union is governed by Article IV, Section 2 of the
United States Constitution, by federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, and
by state laws frequently patterned on the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act."3 The American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States *properly notes that the protections available in domestic transfers of fugitives are less rigorous than
in international extradition: "some of the limitations on international
extradition designed to guard against delivery of a person to a country
with standards of justice lower than those of the forum are not applica' For example, the double criminality rule, requiring that the conble."84

duct be a crime under the laws of both countries, and the doctrine of

specialty, requiring that the defendant be tried only for the crime for
81.

"Noriega is not Panama's head of state. The Executive Branch recognizes an-

other individual, Guillermo Endara, as Panama's President and head of state .... The

Endara Government is therefore the 'appropriate'entity to object to treaty violations
against the Republic of Panama, and this it has not done." Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant Noriega's Motion to Dismiss Indictment. at 910 (emphasis added), United States v. Manuel Antonio Noriega, No. 88-0079 (S.D.
Florida). "Panama has neither objected to Del Cid's seizure nor complained that its
sovereignty was violated." Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to Defendant Del Cid's Request for an Evidentiary Hearing, at 8 n.4, United States v. Manuel
Antonio Noriega, No. 88-0079 (S.D. Fla.).
82. See Extradition Reform Act of 1981. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 390. 391
(1982) (memorandum on treaty termination or suspension under international law by
Daniel Hill Zafren, Specialist in American Public Law, Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service) ("a treaty may effectively be terminated or suspended ...
through the outbreak of hostilities between parties to the agreement")- LORD MCNAIR,
THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 17, at 716 ("in the absence of contrary provisions,
express or implied, an extradition treaty between two States which find themselves at
war with another is at least suspended for the duration of the war.
83. 11 U.L.A. 51 (1974).
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LA.% of THE LITED
STATES § 478 reporters' note 8 (1987).
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which extradition is granted, do not apply between States of the
Union.85
Similarly, in domestic deliveries, "the arrest warrant is issued by the
governor of the requested State, not by a magistrate; and, in general,

judicial scrutiny of the extradition request is narrower than in international extradition." 8 Unlike international extradition, in domestic fugitive delivery there is no inquiry by the courts of the requested state into
the criminal evidence supporting the claim of the requesting state;8 the

requested state may not inquire into the fairness of proceedings in the
requesting state, or the adequacy of its jail facilities. 8 These lessened
standards make sense in a domestic setting, since all court proceedings
are governed by the basic protections of constitutional due process, and
a person is not removed from his own nation.

In international extradition the problem is quite distinct, for the requested country may properly wish to assure itself of the evidence sup-

porting another country's request, and there are often differences in the
basic procedures of trial.8 In this circumstance, the protections appropriate to regulate deliveries and bar the abduction of defendants between foreign jurisdictions, need not apply necessarily in domestic
criminal process.9

The Supreme Court recognized in the 1989 Term that, even where
constitutional restrictions are inapplicable, the reciprocal understandings of treaty law are an appropriate means to protect citizens and
aliens alike. As the Court noted in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,

"[if there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur
85.
86.

Id.
Id.

87. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978); accord California v. Superior Court,
482 U.S. 400 (1987).
88. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952); Pacileo v. Walker, 449 U.S. 86
(1980).
89. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson warned of the special need for safeguards
in international extraditions. In Jefferson's own view, foreign extradition should be allowed only where a grand jury returned a bill of approval. "Reformation of government
with our neighbors, [is] as much wanting now as Reformation of religion is or ever was
anywhere." "'Theexchange of criminals is so difficult between a free and an arbitrary
government." Thomas Jefferson, Heads of consideration on the establishment of Conventions between the United States and their neighbors for the mutual delivery of
Fugitives from Justice (Mar. 22, 1792) (emphasis omitted), in 23 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 328, 329 (C. Cullen ed. 1990): Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (Mar. 16, 1792), in 23 id. at 286. Jefferson counseled against seeking
the informal return of fugitive criminals from Spanish Florida, for fear we would be
required to reciprocate. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington
(Nov. 7. 1791). in 22 id. at 266.
90. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1975).
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incident to ... American action, they must be imposed by the political
branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation." 91
Here, the safeguards of the extradition treaty between Mexico and
the United States were deliberately undertaken in 1980, with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate and approval of the President, continuing a century-old treaty relationship. The District Court properly
relied upon the standards of the 1980 treaty in concluding that the
Court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant abducted from Mexico in violation of the treaty.
2.

THE ABDUCTION OF DEFENDANT ALVAREZ-MACHAIN

VIOLATES

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
BARS ARBITRARY ARRESTS, AND IS INCORPORATED IN UNITED STATES
LAW.

The relation of customary international law to American national
law is well settled. Chief Justice John Marshall held in Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy92 that customary international law is to be
deemed a part of federal law. Justice Horace Gray reiterated this lesson in The Paquete Habana.9 3 It is presumed that the Congress, absent
clear statement to the contrary, intends its statutes to be applied in a
manner consistent with the requirements of international law. American courts have properly declined to choose any interpretation of federal statutory law that would place the United States in breach of an
international obligation, so long as an alternative interpretation is consistent with statutory language and structure. As Chief Justice Marshall instructed, "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains
.""' This includes the exercise of jurisdictional statutes.
Article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares
that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed by the
91.
- U.S. _,
110 S.Ct. 1056, 1066 (1990) (emphasis added).
92. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
93. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Opinion of Attorney General Edmund Randolph (June 26, 1792), in I Op. ATT'Y GEN. 26, 27 ("The law of nations, although not
specially adopted by the constitution or any municipal act, is essentially a part of the
law of the land. Its obligation commences and runs with the existence of a nation.

subject to modifications on some points of indifference.").
94. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118. See also RESTATEIENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987)
("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict
with international law . . . ."); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); Wein-

berger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
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General Assembly of the United Nations, 93 with the strong support of
the United States, and is considered by numerous international law authorities to be a statement of the standards of customary international
law protecting human rights.

International abduction without lawful process is a violation of this
standard of customary international law. Under the deepest norms of

international law, the jurisdiction to apprehend offenders is limited to
the political government that is sovereign in a particular country.00
With democratic governments, this rule gives citizens the ability to
monitor their government, and to assure that power exercised against
them will be used only upon reasonable cause, and with appropriate

process. The abduction of a Mexican citizen disregards this guarantee
of customary international law, as much as the guarantees of the

United States-Mexico extradition treaty, the standards of the Mexican
97
Constitution and Mexican federal law.

Although Judge Rafeedie did not have occasion to reach this ground,
the decision of the District Court finding a lack of personal jurisdiction
over a foreign citizen abducted by government agents from foreign soil

is thus sustained by this settled rule of statutory construction. The language and legislative history of the jurisdictional statutes of United

States district courts over crimes under the United States Code and
rules governing arrest reflect no indication that Congress intended to

violate customary international law by permitting the court's warrant
to be used as pretext for abducting foreign nationals on foreign soilY 8
95. See G.A. Res. 217A (III), 3(l) U.N. GAOR Resolutions 71, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 432(2) (1987) ("A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by
duly authorized officials of that state."); id. § 432 comment b ("Territorialityand law
enforcement. It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state
without the latter's consent."); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE §
125, at 179-80 (1912) ("The duty of every State itself to abstain and to prevent its
agents and subjects from any act which contains a violation of another State's independence or territorial . ..supremacy is correlative to the respective right of the other
State . . .a State is not allowed to send . . . its police forces into or through foreign
territory, or to exercise an act of administration or jurisdiction on foreign territory,
without permission.") (footnotes omitted).
97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 432 reporters' note 1 (1987) (in 1981 Human Rights Committee of United
Nations under International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights decided that "abduction of a Uruguayan refugee from Argentina by Uruguayan security officers constituted arbitrary arrest and detention").
98. See F.R. CRIM. P. 4(d)(2) ("TerritorialLimits. The warrant [of arrest] may
be executed or the summons may be served at any place within the jurisdiction of the
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The jurisdictional statutes reflect no indication that Congress intended
to permit a court to detain a person kidnapped from his homeland;
under customary international law the continued detention itself vio-

lates the rights of the state from which the individual was abducted. 0
Parallel to United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization,' the

absence of any statement by Congress that it intended federal criminal
jurisdiction to be exercised in violation of international law is sufficient
to preclude its exercise.

Kidnapping is a continuing offense. The arbitrariness of abducting a
foreign citizen from his homeland does not cease once he is over the
border. If a North American were kidnapped by the agents of a Latin
American country and put on trial in a Latin American courtroom, the
abducting state's responsibility for his return and the continuing
wrongful character of his detention under international law would not
cease merely because he was forced over the frontier into the abduc-

tor's jurisdiction. Without a clear expression by Congress, Judge
Rafeedie's order finding an absence of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was entirely consistent with this rule of American law.
Ker is again not to the contrary. Ker was a state, not federal prosecution, and in the late nineteenth century, issues of customary interna-

tional law did not constitute a federal question which could be reviewed
on writ of error to the Supreme Court.101 The Ker Court specifically
noted that it could not seek to resolve, on writ of error, the questions
United States."); F.R. CRIM. P. 4(d)(1) ("The warrant shall be executed by a marshal
or by some other officer authorized by law."); 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (criminal jurisdiction
of United States district courts).
99.

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 432 comment c (1987) ("If a state's law enforcement officials exercise their
functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is
entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation from the offending
state. If the unauthorizedaction includes abduction of a person, the state from which
the person was abducted may demand return of the person, and international law
requires that he be returned.") (emphasis added).
100. 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
STATES

101.

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 111 reporters' note 3 (1987) ("State determinations of international law were
originally not thought to be subject to review by the United States Supreme Court",
citingNew York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875); Oliver American
Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440 (1924); Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated
Soviet Republic, 266 U.S. 580 (1924); Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d
Cir. 1948) (Learned Hand, J.). The landscape was changed by Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) ("rules of international law should not be
left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations"). Issues of customary international law now constitute federal questions for purposes of appeal.
STATES
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raised under the unwritten or customary law of nations. 10 2 In addition,
as noted above, Ker was limited by its unusual facts.
The Paquete Habana raises the possibility that a "controlling act"
by one of the political branches may displace the usual incorporation of
customary international law into national law. But it is clear under The
Paquete Habana that such an act must be made at the highest levels of
responsibility. In The Paquete Habana, a case involving the seizure of
prize vessels in time of war, the Court demanded that the controlling
act be made by the President; even the act of a ranking Admiral, approving the seizure of Cuban fishing boats as prize vessels, was deemed
insufficient. 10 3 The United States Attorney has not purported to suggest
that the President of the United States has authorized or ordered the
seizure of Mexican citizens in the territory of Mexico in displacement
of Mexico's own government.104 In addition it is at least arguable that
any controlling act which concerns the jurisdiction of the federal courts
102. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 444:
The question of how far his forcible seizure in another country, and transfer
by violence, force, or fraud, to this country, could be made available to resist
trial in the State court ... is one which we do not feel called upon to decide ....
...[T]he decision of that question is as much within the province of the State
court, as a question of common law, or of the law of nations, of which that court
is bound to take notice, as it is of the courts of the United States. And though we
might or might not differ with the Illinois court on that subject, it is one in which
we have no right to review their decision.
103. 175 U.S. at 677. There is no showing in this case that the Attorney General
approved or authorized the abduction of defendant Alvarez-Machain. Even if there
were, this case differs fundamentally from Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986), where the court was asked to enjoin the Attorney General from using his statutory authority to detain Cuban aliens ineligible for
entry. A criminal defendant is detained by the court's own authority, whereas an alien
applying for admission to the territorial United States is excluded by the authority of
the Attorney General.
104. In this, one may again contrast the Noriega case, where the President issued
an order to United States troops invading Panama, authorizing them to apprehend
Noriega as part of their military operation:
In the course of carrying out the military operation in Panama which I have
directed, I hereby direct and authorize the units and members of the Armed
Forces of the United States to apprehend General Manuel Noriega and any
other persons in Panama currently under indictment in the United States for
drug-related offenses. I further direct that any persons apprehended pursuant to
this directive are to be turned over to civil law enforcement officials of the United
States as soon as practicable.
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the President of the United States
(Dec. 20, 1989), reproduced in Government's Memorandum of Law in Response to
Defendant Del Cid's Motion to Dismiss, at 3, United States v. Manuel Noriega, No.
88-0079 (S.D. Fla.).
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should have the concurrence of the Congress,105 to which Article III
assigns the special task of establishing the jurisdiction of the first and
second tier federal courts. The prescription of rules of judicial jurisdiction and procedure is not a part of the duties of the Presidency under
the principles of separation of powers and is inconsistent with the historic independence of the judiciary from Executive control. The Drug
Enforcement Agency has never sought or obtained statutory authorization from the Congress to abduct individuals from foreign states in violation of the standards of customary international law.
CONCLUSION
The order of the District Court, finding that the Court could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant abducted from Mexico
by persons acting at the request of United States agents, should be
affirmed.

105. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty. 100 HARV. L.
853, 882-84 (1987) (narrow class of "controlling executive acts" intended by The
Paquete Habana).
REV.

